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Diversity and Democracy: Agent-Based Modeling  
in Political Philosophy 
Bennett Holman, William J. Berger, Daniel J. Singer,  
Patrick Grim & Aaron Bramson ∗ 
Abstract: »Diversität und Demokratie: Agent-Based Modelling in der politi-
schen Philosophie«. Agent-based models have played a prominent role in re-
cent debates about the merits of democracy. In particular, the formal model of 
Lu Hong and Scott Page and the associated “diversity trumps ability” result has 
typically been seen to support the epistemic virtues of democracy over epistocra-
cy (i.e., governance by experts). In this paper we first identify the modeling 
choices embodied in the original formal model and then critique the applica-
tion of the Hong-Page results to philosophical debates on the relative merits of 
democracy. In particular we argue that the “best-performing agents” in the 
Hong-Page model should not be interpreted as experts. We next explore a 
closely related model in which best-performing agents are more plausibly seen 
as experts and show that the diversity trumps ability result fails to hold. How-
ever, with changes in other parameters (such as the deliberation dynamic) the 
diversity trumps ability result is restored. The sensitivity of this result to pa-
rameter choices illustrates the complexity of the link between formal modeling 
and more general philosophical claims; we use this debate as a platform for a 
more general discussion of when and how agent-based models can contribute 
to philosophical discussions. 
Keywords: Epistemic democracy, epistocracy, expertise, agent-based models, 
representation, deliberation, cognitive diversity, problem solving, democracy, 
wise crowds. 
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The view that it is more proper for the multitude to be sovereign than the few of 
greatest virtue might be thought to be explicable and to have some justification, and 
even to be the true view. For it is possible that the many, though not individually 
good men, yet when they come together may be better, not individually but collec-
tively, than those who are so, just as public dinners to which many contribute are 
better than those supplied at one man's cost; for where there are many, each  
individual, it may be argued, has some portion of virtue and wisdom, and when they 
have come together, just as the multitude becomes a single man with many feet and 
many hands and many senses, so also it becomes one personality as regards the  
moral and intellectual faculties. (Aristotle Pol 3.1281a-b) 
1.  Introduction 
A recognition of the ‘wisdom of the crowds’ has been a source of optimism for 
democratic theorists, suggesting democracy has a competitive advantage over 
alternative regimes. Some political philosophers have made agent-based mod-
eling (ABM) central to this discussion with their claim that Lu Hong and Scott 
Page’s (2004) “diversity trumps ability” result (DTA) formally indicates the 
epistemic virtues of democracy (Anderson, 2006; Gaus 2016; Landemore 
2013a, 2013b; Schwartzberg 2015). But there has also been pushback to this 
move, questioning whether the Hong-Page results have such an implication 
(Ahlstrom-Vij 2012; Weymark 2015). Some have argued that the Hong-Page 
results are compatible with (or positively support) a form of epistocracy, where 
the knowers or experts dictate the policy of the state (Ancell 2016; Brennan 
2016).  
Here we attempt to go deeper into the models crucial to the debate, but also 
attempt to go beyond those specifics in order to reflect more generally on the 
promise and pitfalls of attempts to draw philosophical lessons from agent-based 
models. We present our own extensions to the Hong-Page model, illustrating 
with that example how such an application of ABMs can make philosophical 
argumentation more rigorous. In Section 2, we discuss the Hong-Page results, 
describing both the dynamics of the ABM and the modeling decisions therein. 
In Section 3, we argue that interpreting the Hong-Page results as pertaining to 
predictive expertise is implausible. We identify test-retest reliability as a mini-
mal criterion of predictive expertise and show that the “best-performing 
agents” in the Hong-Page model fail to meet such a criterion. In Section 4 we 
explore a set of extensions to the original model, showing that the Hong-Page 
‘Diversity Trumps Ability’ result fails to hold in parameter subspaces in which 
claims of predictive expertise are more plausible. In Section 5 we explore the 
parameter sensitivity of this result and show that the DTA result reemerges 
with other suites of parameters. 
The remainder of the paper pivots from formal models to the wider question 
of philosophical interpretation and social application. Section 6 provides an 
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illustration of how such models are used in political philosophy, and how ex-
tensions such as ours might reflect on the limited generality of such arguments. 
We use Helene Landemore’s Democratic Reason (2013a) as a case study due 
to its influential application of ABMs to questions in political philosophy. In 
that regard, we show how our extensions offer further refinements to the con-
jectures presented in her work. Finally, Section 7 argues for the importance of 
carefully identifying modeling assumptions and relevant extensions, particular-
ly when leveraging ABMs in practical literatures such as political philosophy. 
We conclude by suggesting what further steps are needed to bridge the gap 
between the two. 
2. Unpacking the Hong Page Result 
The Hong-Page model consists of three important components: (1) Problems 
and problem characteristics (epistemic landscapes); (2) Agents; (3) Individual 
problem solving; (4) Group formation; and (5) Group problem solving dynam-
ics. In the model, sets of agents navigate an epistemic landscape in an attempt 
to identify the landscape’s highest point (the global maximum). In this section, 
we examine the model in two passes. First, we explain these five features of the 
Hong-Page model dynamics and we explore the modeling choices made in 
each case. We will return to discuss the importance of these modeling choices 
later in the paper. 
2.1   Model Dynamics 
Problems and problem characteristics (epistemic landscapes): The ‘problem’ 
that the agents are trying to solve is represented through the epistemic land-
scape. The landscape consists of a set of two thousand points arranged in a ring 
such that the last point is adjacent to the first – once agents reach the 2,000th 
spot, they loop back to the first. In the original model, each point is randomly 
assigned a value between 0 and 100. Points with higher values are understood 
as better solutions to the problem. 
Agents: Each agent is assigned a random ‘heuristic,’ an ordered set of three 
natural numbers between one and twelve (e.g. [8,2,9]), which dictates how the 
agent moves around the landscape. The ‘maximum heuristic value’ is the great-
est number that can appear in a heuristic. There are 1,320 possible heuristics 
using an ordered set of 3 unique numbers from 1 to a maximum heuristic value 
of 12.  
Individual problem solving: Problem solving is represented as movement 
across the landscape in search of the best solution (i.e. the point with the high-
est value). At any given moment an agent occupies a space with some value, 
but is looking to move to a better solution. To decide whether to move, the 
HSR 43 (2018) 1 │ 262 
agent uses her first heuristic value, say ‘5,’ to probe the point five spaces to the 
right. If that point has a higher value than the one she currently occupies, she 
moves to it and repeats this procedure from her new spot using the next value 
in her heuristic. If the probed space has a lower value she stays on the original 
spot and tries her next heuristic value. She stops exploring the epistemic land-
scape when she cannot reach a higher point with any of the elements in her 
heuristic.  
For example, consider the agent represented in Figure 1. The agent finds 
herself on point 1987 with the heuristic (3,8,2). The agent first uses the ‘3’ to 
check point 1990, but stays because the point is lower. She next uses the ‘8’ to 
check point 1995, which she then moves to because it is higher. From point 
1995 she next uses the ‘2’ to check point 1997, then the ‘3’ to check 1998 and 
‘8’ to check point 3. Because all of them have lesser values, she halts on point 
1995. The final value for the agent starting from point 1987 is thus 82, the 
height of point 1995.  
Figure 1: An Example of One Agent on a Hong-Page Epistemic Landscape 
 
Group formation: Hong and Page create two different groups. The first is cre-
ated by taking the nine best-performing agents. To determine the best-
performing agents, a landscape is generated and a score is determined for the 
first agent by starting her from each of the 2,000 points on the landscape and 
averaging the values obtained at every corresponding stopping point. This is 
repeated for each of the 1,320 possible heuristics. Agents are then ranked ac-
cording to their average performance, with higher-scoring agents interpreted as 
having greater ability. The “high ability” group is composed of the nine agents 
with the highest ability (i.e. the highest average score on the landscape). A 
second group is composed simply by randomly selecting nine from the pool of 
all agents, irrespective of individual ability.  
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Group problem solving dynamics: Both groups of nine agents move around 
the landscape as in a relay race. When the first group member gets stuck, the 
second agent tries out their heuristic, continuing until they get stuck, and so on. 
The group halts at the point at which no agent can identify a better solution. 
The ‘Diversity Trumps Ability’ result is the finding that groups of randomly 
selected agents regularly outperform groups composed of the nine individually 
best-performing agents (i.e. the group of randomly selected agents finds points 
with higher values). 
2.2  Model Conditions 
Hong and Page (2004, 16387) explicitly identify four modeling assumptions: 
that the agents are minimally intelligent, that the agents are diverse, that the 
best agent is unique, and importantly for our analysis, that the problem is diffi-
cult.1 But their epistemic landscape itself embeds a number of assumptions as 
well. The epistemic landscape is a discrete, one-dimensional domain in which 
each spot has a corresponding value drawn from a uniform distribution. But of 
course this is not the only way of generating epistemic landscapes. For exam-
ple, many problem solving situations will be best modeled by multi-
dimensional landscapes.2 Even on a single dimension, the function used to 
generate the values at each point embodies a modeling choice. One important 
property of the original model is the independence of adjacent points. The 
value of an agent’s current position on the landscape contains no information 
about points in the immediate vicinity. The best solution in the landscape is just 
as likely to be proximate to the second best solution as it is to be proximate to 
the worst. 
The ordering of points is standardly interpreted to capture how well the 
agent(s) understand the problem they are attempting to solve. A perfect under-
standing of the problem would create a monotonic ordering of values from 
lowest to highest. Landscapes that “fail to embed understanding […] result in 
very rugged landscapes” (Page 2007, 140). The landscape used by Hong and 
Page is at the latter end of the spectrum as the value of each point is independ-
ent of the point before it. As such, the extremely rugged landscape used by 
Hong and Page represents problem solving in a case where none of the agents 
possess any understanding of the problem. 
The agents, as well as the landscape, embed assumptions. It is worth noting 
that all agents possess a heuristic vector with the same number of elements. 
                                                             
1  Hong and Page classify a problem as “difficult” when no individual problem solver regularly 
finds the global maximum (i.e. where working in groups has the potential to improve on 
individual performance, cf. Page 2007, 159).  
2  For one alternative landscape see Alexander, Himmelreich and Thompson (2015) or Fon-
tanari and Rodrigues (2016) for their use of NK-landscapes that allows both higher dimen-
sionality and more “rugged” problem spaces.  
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Page (2007, 145) notes that, for example, people who score higher on IQ tests 
likely have more tools (i.e. elements in their heuristic).3 We could, therefore, 
consider agents with heuristics of different sizes (i.e. some heuristics with three 
elements and others with more).  
Agents use a “gradient heuristic” (see Page 2007, 62) meaning that agents 
are always able to accurately determine whether the next step they take is of 
greater value and never move to a lower value, either accidently (because they 
misjudge its value) or purposely (to further explore the landscape). Yet, as Page 
(2007) notes there are other classes of heuristics that agents might use to move 
across a landscape, including some that allow agents to explore initially less 
promising paths to see if they ultimately lead to higher ground (e.g. simulated 
annealing), to assess multiple possible solutions simultaneously, or to restrict 
movement only to adjacent spaces. Agents are also limited in their ability to 
anticipate the results of successive application. Unlike a skilled chess player, 
they can only see “one move ahead.”  
This short list suffices to give a sense of the way in which the Hong-Page 
model encodes a particular problem situation. In and of themselves, of course, 
explicit modeling choices offer no grounds for critique. Any model simplifies 
reality, excluding a number of features. The best models include what is rele-
vant and leave off what is not; articulating what is not included in the model 
serves primarily to describe rather than critique. If such factors turn out to be 
unimportant, their absence in the model is a virtue. We mention details here to 
give the reader some appreciation for both what is in the model and what has 
been omitted – a point we will return to in the conclusion in discussing direc-
tions for future research. In the next sections we examine the consequences of 
varying some of these modeling choices and show that the DTA is sensitive to 
at least some of the original modeling decisions. 
3.  Interpreting Hong-Page: Expertise 
What can be learned from these modeling results? The headline interpretation 
is that ‘diversity trumps ability,’ with the implication that a random collection 
of skills or approaches will yield better outcomes than a cultivated collection of 
skills. The core result, more carefully stated, is that for a given type of difficult 
problem, groups of randomly chosen agents regularly outperform groups of 
“better performing” agents. But the DTA result has also been taken to imply 
that a random selection of agents will outperform groups of experts (e.g., An-
                                                             
3  Page is quick to point out this does not mean they are “smarter” just that they have more 
tools applicable to standardize tests. One of their primary points is that ability is context 
specific and thus high performance on standardized tests need not translate to other set-
tings where people with low test scores might outperform “smarter” individuals.  
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derson 2006; Gunn 2014). For example, Farrelly argues that Hong and Page 
show that “the central failure […] of ‘epistocracy’ stems from the fact that it 
equates collective ability with the individual ability of experts working in isola-
tion” (2012, 17). We’ll argue that this terminology isn’t warranted, however, at 
least in terms of the original model. In explaining why, we will motivate a 
model extension that is more plausibly interpreted in terms of expertise.  
“Best performing” is an uncomplicated measure of success in the Hong-
Page model: it refers to those agents that score the highest, on average, on a 
given landscape. In at least one intuitive sense, true ‘expertise’ requires some-
thing more. As Goldman and Blanchard (2016) put it, “[a]n expert in any do-
main will know more truths and have more evidence […] , and these things can 
be used to form true beliefs about new questions concerning the domain.” In 
this sense of expertise, which we’ll label ‘predictive expertise,’ we should 
expect the success of an expert on one problem (landscape) to be correlated 
with their success on a new problem (landscape). When there is no such corre-
lation, the better performance on a single landscape fails to meet this minimal 
condition. It is still the case that some agents do better than others, but ‘best 
performance’ in this case might better be viewed as a result of randomness or 
luck than any general ability or transportable expertise. Focusing on predictive 
expertise, we’ll investigate how and whether the Hong-Page Diversity Trumps 
Ability (‘DTA’) result can be generalized to a Diversity Trumps Expertise 
(‘DTE’) result. 
Consider Robert Hodgson’s (2008) assault on expert wine tasters. To deter-
mine if expert wine ratings were truly tracking the quality of the wine, he in-
serted multiple pourings of the same wine into the tastings at the California 
State Fair Wine Competition (the oldest commercial competition in the US). 
On a twenty-point scale, the median range for test-retest reliability was about 4 
points. Only 10% of the judges in a given year were “consistently consistent” 
in that they routinely rated wines in the same medal category (a four-point 
spread) each time. These results might be taken to indicate that only a small 
percentage of even the crème de la crème are true predictive experts. However, 
by tracking judges across years, he showed that a judge’s consistency one year 
does not predict the judge’s consistency in the following year. In other words, 
the judges that appeared to be consistently consistent were just lucky, no more 
consistent than other judges. In subsequent work Hodgson (2009) analyzed 
wines that had been entered in multiple competitions and found that the proba-
bility of winning gold in one event was probabilistically independent of win-
ning gold at another competition. 
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Examples like this could be multiplied, but the upshot is the same: predic-
tive expertise is demonstrated by repeated success.4 Applying these lessons to 
the Hong-Page model, we can ask how we might distinguish luck from skill. 
One thing that will not work is rerunning the same agents on the same land-
scape (i.e. one with the same values for each spot). Since the process is deter-
minate, the outcomes of a literal test-retest will always be the same. Alterna-
tively, we might create an artificial test-retest measure by dividing the 
landscape into two halves and asking to what extent performance on the front 
half correlates with performance on the back half. As it turns out, the answer to 
this is: not very much. A Pearson correlation of such a test-retest found that 
performance on the first half of the landscape only predicted 1% of the vari-
ance of the agent’s performance in the second half – leaving the remaining 
99% unexplained. If expertise requires the ability to repeat successes on the 
same kind of problem, these best-performing agents are not ‘experts’– at least 
not in the predictive sense. 
On these grounds, we claim that the “best-performing agents” in the original 
Hong Page model should not be interpreted as modeling predictive expertise or 
the performance of experts. A better interpretation of the result might not be 
‘diversity trumps ability,’ with its tempting generalization to expertise. The 
better interpretation might be ‘In problems where there are no real experts, it is 
a diverse group that typically does best.’  
4. Hong-Page Model Extension: Correlated Landscapes  
In an attempt to better model predictive expertise, we need to construct a prob-
lem space in which individual performance is correlated across different runs 
of the model. Above we noted that in the original model, the value at each 
point in the landscape is uncorrelated with the next, thus modeling a situation 
in which no agent has any understanding of the problem. It is perhaps unsur-
prising that such problems don’t allow for the emergence of expertise. One way 
to induce correlation in the landscape would be to assign a new value to every 
other point, or every third point, or every 10th point, and then fill in the inter-
mediate points with intermediate values.  
Below we adopt a similar, though slightly more sophisticated version of the 
same idea by introducing a “smoothing factor” (SF). As in the original model, 
we assign a random value to the first point in the landscape. Instead of repeat-
ing this for every point, we next randomly choose an integer between 1 and 
2n+1, where n is the smoothness parameter. We then move forward that many 
                                                             
4  This is the same intuition embedded in hypothesis testing. We know that two sample means 
differ, what we want to know is how confident we can be that the difference was not due 
to mere chance. 
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spaces on the epistemic landscape, assign that point a new random value and 
assign intermediate values to points in between. As n increases, the landscape 
becomes less random. More crucial for our purposes, as seen in Table 1, when 
the landscape becomes less random, the test-retest reliability of agents emerges 
(and does so quite quickly). The test-retest correlations indicate that at a 
smoothness of 1, the performance in the first half of the landscape explains 
roughly 60% of the performance in the second half and between 85% and 92% 
of the variance at smoothness values between 2 and 20.5 
Keeping other parameters the same, we reran the simulation on 100 land-
scapes at each smoothness to compare the average performance of groups of 
best-performing agents and randomly selected groups. Table 1 shows that the 
DTA result fails to hold for smoothness values greater than 3.6 For the majority 
of the parameter settings considered here, where the result supports an interpre-
tation of ability or expertise, groups of the best-performing agents tend to out-
perform randomly selected groups. 
Table 1: Average Pearson Correlations Comparing Agent Performance between 
the Front and Back Halves of the Model over 100 Repetitions for All 
Heuristics at Landscapes of a Given Smoothing Factor 
SF Correlation DTA  SF Correlation DTA  SF Correlation DTA 
0 0.09 Y  7 0.96 N  14 0.94 N 
1 0.78 Y  8 0.95 N  15 0.93 N 
2 0.93 Y  9 0.96 N  16 0.93 N 
3 0.95 Y  10 0.94 N  17 0.92 N 
4 0.96 N  11 0.95 N  18 0.92 N 
5 0.96 N  12 0.93 N  19 0.92 N 
6 0.96 N  13 0.94 N  20 0.93 N 
The Column label “DTA” records whether the result obtains. The original landscape is SF = 0. 
5. Assessing Robustness 
Given other parameter settings in the original Hong Page model, Section 4 
shows that the DTA result holds only for a limited range of landscape smooth-
ness. There are other parameters that might also be expected to impact DTA 
results and in their original paper Hong and Page investigate a number of pa-
rameters to demonstrate that their result is robust. Here we adopt the same 
strategy to assess the robustness of our result and determine whether the DTA 
                                                             
5  Percent of variance explained is calculated by squaring the correlation coefficient. 
6  At SF = 4 the groups are roughly equal and from 4-20 groups of experts are superior. For 
finer detail on these simulations, see the parameter sweeps in Figures 3 and 4 (group size = 
9, max-heuristic = 12).   
HSR 43 (2018) 1 │ 268 
result only obtains in portions of the parameter space that fail to support an 
interpretation of predictive expertise. We conducted parameter sweeps across 
smoothing factors 0-30 for each of the following parameters: (a) for maximum 
heuristic values 4-20, (b) for groups of 3, 6, and 9, and (c) using two kinds of 
group dynamics: relay and tournament.  
First, a word about the last of these. In the original model, as in our exten-
sion above, groups of agents used a relay dynamic. In the relay dynamic each 
agent moves until reaching her stopping condition, at which point she “passes 
the baton” over to the next agent who takes over, and so on until no agent in the 
group can find a better solution. In their original paper Hong and Page (2004) 
also consider a tournament dynamic in which every agent announces the point 
they would reach applying their heuristic from the group’s current starting 
point. The group then moves to the highest point reachable by any agent and all 
of the agents again announce the point they would reach starting from this 
point. The group halts when no agent can move from the current starting point. 
The results across parameter sweeps are shown in Figures 2 through 7. Fig-
ures 2 (relay dynamic) and 5 (tournament dynamic) display the information in 
its most basic form by recording whether randomly selected groups or groups 
of best-performing agents did better on average. Figures 3 (relay dynamic) and 
6 (tournament dynamic) display the average difference between the groups and 
is thus sensitive to the degree to which one group is outperformed by the other. 
Figures 4 (relay dynamic) and 7 (tournament dynamic) ignore the difference 
between the paired samples and simply record what percentage of cases one 
group outperforms the other in a sample of 100 runs.  
With respect to the interpretation of these results, the maximum heuristic, 
can be thought of as the total number of unique conceptual resources or skills 
that are available to agents. Each heuristic is a different potential move for-
ward, but there is nothing intrinsically better about having heuristic 4 or heuris-
tic 12. In the original model, Hong and Page (2004) considered both cases 
where the maximum heuristic was 12 and 20 and found qualitatively similar 
results. In contrast, as can be seen in each figure, as the maximum heuristic 
increases, so does the portion of the parameter space where DTA obtains. 
A second parameter is group size. In stating their original result, Hong and 
Page require that groups be ‘good sized’; the groups of 9 we use throughout are 
very close to the groups of 10 they use in simulation. In limited confirmation of 
that requirement, it appears that larger groups – at least up to some point–
increase the portion of the parameter space that favors diversity. In groups of 
three the vast majority of the parameter space favors experts.  
Our third parameter is group dynamics. While Hong and Page report no dif-
ference between the two dynamics on the original landscapes, we find signifi-
cant divergence between the results, particularly as they interact with the other 
variables. In general, the tournament dynamics increase the portion of the pa-
rameter space in which the DTA result obtains. This is especially true for large 
HSR 43 (2018) 1 │ 269 
groups (n = 9) with at least a moderate maximum heuristic (roughly 10 or 
greater).  
In addition to these parameter tests, we test group composition by altering 
the ratio of best-performing agents and randomly assigned agents in groups for 
both relay (Figure 8) and tournament (Figure 9) dynamics. The groups can 
contain all randomly assigned agents, all ‘experts,’ or some mixture in be-
tween. We also construct a group with maximum diversity by choosing a ran-
dom digit for the first number in the heuristic of the first member, constraining 
successive choices for later members of the group so as to duplicate heuristic 
numbers as little as possible. For example, if the number 11 is already assigned 
to the heuristic of a previous group member, it is removed as a candidate for 
further assignments. Once every number has been assigned once, they are all 
made freshly available for the next assignment. 
Here we find a number of interesting results. First, both max-diversity and 
all-random groups do best initially and DTA cleanly obtains in the relay dy-
namic for a smoothing factor of 0. Max-diversity performs best overall for 
smoothing factors 0-2 in relay and 0-3 in tournament play. This indicates as 
above, that in some parameter settings with low levels of within-landscape 
correlation, heuristic diversity holds an advantage over expertise. That being 
said, adding one expert to the group allows it to perform at least as well (relay) 
if not better (tournament) than all-random at every smoothing factor. Indeed, at 
more highly correlated landscapes all-random and max-diversity do quite poor-
ly. By contrast, a group of all experts does even worse in tournament mode, but 
does quite well for higher smoothing factors in relay play. Within the standard 
interpretation of the model, our results show that diversity is important where 
there is a poor understanding of the problem (i.e. where landscape is highly 
random), but as the problem becomes better understood, the best groups are 
increasingly made up of experts. Whether, and under what circumstances we 
should take these results to apply to actual groups of problem solvers will be 
considered in the next section.  
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Figure 8: Normalized Averages for Pure and Mixed Groups of Size 9 Using a 
Relay Group Dynamics  
 
Groups with maximum diversity (yellow line) perform well in areas of the parameter space 
with a high degree of randomness. In areas where the problems are better understood, the 
best groups are made mostly of experts (dotted purple line). 
 
Figure 9: Normalized Averages for Pure and Mixed Groups of Size 9 Using a 
Tournament Group Dynamics 
 
In sum, these results qualify and add nuance to our conclusions in Section 4. 
There we found that diversity trumped ability only for lower smoothing factors. 
As the landscape became less random, groups of experts regularly outper-
formed groups of randomly selected agents. Here, we find larger portions of the 
parameter space where the DTA result holds. Moreover, we find that not only 
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are there conditions under which diversity trumps ability, but that it makes 
sense to go further and claim that it is possible for diversity to trump expertise, 
since groups of randomly selected agents come to outperform groups of the 
best-performing agents in some portions of the parameter space which support 
an interpretation in terms of predictive expertise. However, the parameter sen-
sitivity of the results should inspire caution in those whose interest lies in mov-
ing from these models to real world policy prescriptions. DTA’s dependence on 
a number of modeling assumption emphasizes the need to gather further evi-
dence before relying on such results in application, a point we expand upon in 
the conclusion.  
6.  Using Model Extensions to Probe Philosophical 
Arguments 
The original Hong-Page model has received significant attention among practi-
cal philosophers. David Estlund (1997, 2009) and Jason Brennan (2011, 2016), 
among others, have asked why epistocracy is not preferable to democracy, 
given that experts are more apt to arrive at the truth than the hoi polloi. The 
DTA result has been cited as evidence for the epistemic superiority of democ-
racy, providing formal evidence against these worries. While there are others 
who make use of DTA, we focus here on its deployment by Helene Landemore 
(2013a) in light of her close and careful consideration of the application of the 
original model. Doing so provides an excellent illustration of how ABMs and 
model extensions can shape and inform philosophical arguments.  
The Hong-Page result gives us reason to believe that a diverse set of agents 
selected from the masses might well have the capacity to identify better solu-
tions than a collection of rarified technocrats. Landemore makes use of the 
Hong-Page model to argue for the superiority of democracy in deliberative 
contexts by noting that its “results show that in groups of problem solvers it is 
often more important to maximize cognitive diversity […] than individual 
competence” (2013a, 121). Unlike voting, which is most often conceived of as 
a majoritarian process, deliberation is a project of consensus building (Lan-
demore 2013a, 92). As arguments are made and alternatives discussed, some 
will be revealed to be better than others.  
Consider the example of a jury. As jurors deliberate about the evidence and 
the merits of a case, they change their beliefs and are ideally either all persuad-
ed of guilt or they come to a verdict of not guilty (or not proven). They all 
agree on the nature of the problem, and they seek to uncover the relevant evi-
dence in order to arrive at the right conclusion – what we can think of in the 
context of the Hong-Page model as the global maximum. 
Deliberation is one process that comes to mark democratic procedures by 
positing “an ideal speech situation where there are no time and information 
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constraints, to reach an uncoerced agreement on the ‘better argument’” (Lan-
demore 2013a, 92). The Hong-Page model fits well as a model of such an ide-
alization, as it puts no information constraints between agents. Each agent is 
capable of locating, identifying, and communicating the value of their identi-
fied solution, free from time constraints.  
While mindful of the details of the model – including the difficulty of the 
problem, basic agent competency, existence of local optima, and large popula-
tion size – Landemore (2013a) believes that DTA gives us reason to think that 
democratic deliberation proffers a particular efficacy. We might ask why dem-
ocratic deliberation is special, however, as opposed to say internal deliberation 
in which one sits alone thinking very hard about a particular problem.7 Lan-
demore’s answer here – one motivated by the Hong-Page model – is that “larg-
er deliberating groups are simply more likely to be cognitively diverse […] the 
more inclusive the deliberation process, the smarter the solutions resulting from 
it should be, overall” (2013a, 104). Diverse groups need not be better, but in 
the face of uncertainty (a characteristic of many of the problems we face) it is 
better to expand the sphere of politics to include more voices, rather than dis-
criminate in favor of nominal experts. 
She goes on, however, to consider representative domains, in which a sam-
ple must be drawn from among the population in order to deliberate on some 
matter – be it a jury or the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. And while she 
admits that it is appealing to consider selecting those with a particular set of 
cognitive resources (“oversampling cognitive minorities” as she calls it), such 
an impulse would be ultimately unwise. “This is due, essentially, to the unpre-
dictable nature of political questions” (Landemore 2013a, 110).  
Given that Landemore’s (2013a) argument relies on her interpretation of the 
Hong-Page model, the model’s properties bear on her argument for the superi-
ority of diversity. Our modeling extensions can shed further light on her central 
conjectures, or at least articulate the appropriate scope of her claims. Consider-
ation of the range of modeling results provides an example of how modeling 
can be used both to support and constrain philosophical argumentation. 
Landemore claims that the Hong-Page “results show that in groups of prob-
lem solvers it is more important to maximize cognitive diversity […] than 
individual competence” (2013b, 1210). Our creation of the max-diversity group 
and our extension of the Hong-Page model allows us to explore this conjecture. 
If her analysis is right, a ‘maximum diversity’ group should do better than a 
random group (and a fortiori better than a group of the best-performing 
agents). In support of Landemore’s claim that it is diversity per se that drives 
                                                             
7  In the original results, the best individual was regularly outperformed by both groups of 
experts and groups of randomly chosen agents (Hong and Page 2004). 
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the DTA, we do indeed find that the max-diversity group outperformed all 
other groups under the original Hong-Page parameter settings.8 
Similarly, Landemore relies on the Hong-Page model to support the claim 
that because “cognitive diversity can trump individual ability, more inclusive 
groups are likely to be smarter” (2013b, 1217) and that this will hold even if it 
means “dumbing down” the average performance of the group. As before our 
extensions allow us to probe Landemore’s claim by creating modeling ana-
logues of her assertion. Restricting our attention to the original parameter set-
tings (relay dynamic, max-heuristic = 12, group size = 9, smoothness = 0), we 
find support for Landemore’s claim. The max-diversity group outperformed all 
other group including the group of randomly selected agents. Groups that had 
all or nearly all of its nine members selected randomly were roughly equivalent 
in terms of their performance. Moreover, Landemore’s claim that group per-
formance can go up even as the individual average goes down finds support. 
By construction, replacing a best-performing agent with a random agent will 
nearly always reduce the average ability of the individuals in the group. We 
find that beyond a ratio of 6 randomly selected agents to 3 best-performing 
agents, there was a steady decrease as each randomly selected agent was re-
placed by one of the best-performers. The worst group of all was composed 
entirely of best-performing agents.  
Yet given that Landemore (2013b) is interested in applying these claims to 
areas where there are genuine subject experts, the original Hong-Page model 
offers no support. While the results on the original landscapes are consistent 
with Landemore’s (2013b) claim, as we argued in Section 4, the original model 
does not support an interpretation in terms of ability, in the sense of predictive 
expertise. As illustrated in Figures 8 and 9, while “max-diversity” outperforms 
a randomly chosen group in all cases, it is outperformed by any group with 
even a single expert for the majority of the parameters settings considered here. 
Moreover, in the relay dynamics, groups tend to be better off the more experts 
they have, although it is worth noting that the best groups have one or two 
randomly chosen members amongst the experts.  
In summary, our results show that some of the lessons philosophers have 
drawn from the work of Hong and Page can be better supported by creating 
variations on the original model to test the conjecture – whether maximizing 
cognitive diversity lead to better outcomes, for example. Our work also under-
scores the importance of assessing the robustness of a result by varying param-
eters in the model. While the original model lends support for Landemore’s 
(2013b) claim that we would be better off trusting our decisions to randomly 
selected groups, our results suggest a more nuanced view: Random and diverse 
                                                             
8  To be clear, the construction of the max-diversity group confirms Landemore’s understand-
ing of what is driving the DTA modeling result, not whether this result applies to any real 
world situation. We discuss using models to inform policy discussions in the next section. 
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groups can perform quite well, and even optimally (e.g. when problem solving 
performance is a matter of luck), but they are not the best at identifying optimal 
solutions under all circumstances. When problems admit of true ability, for 
instance those tackled by bureaucratic agencies, expertise is plausibly im-
portant. Thus the Hong-Page model is not an unqualified argument in favor of 
democracy. Under some salient conditions a mixture of experts and non-
experts proves to be epistemically optimal.  
On the broader point, however, these extensions illustrate how ABMs can be 
used to craft, hone, and revise philosophical conjectures. Landemore does an 
outstanding job of deploying DTA with attention to the model’s constraints. 
However, the original model is silent about the tradeoff between a mixed-
composition group of experts and randomly selected agents. Beyond clarifying 
the effect our extensions have on the political philosophical debate here, the 
current work illustrates the broader point that by recruiting ABMs we can offer 
constructive amendments to central claims merely by tweaking the underlying 
model. Relying on ABMs allows for easier more lucid philosophical argumen-
tation, in which the grounds of disagreement can be made more transparent.  
6.  Conclusion 
Our results demonstrate that a modeling perspective alone is insufficient to 
determine whether a group of experts or randomly selected agents should be 
expected to be epistemically superior. We first showed that the original diversi-
ty trumps ability result obtained on random landscapes in which “best-
performing agents” were best thought of as lucky rather than good. When we 
modified the landscapes so that they might support an interpretation in terms of 
predictive expertise or ability we found that the best groups were composed of 
experts.  
Changing still other parameters, such as group dynamic, dramatically in-
creased the portion of the parameter space in which diversity trumps ability. 
We find it particularly intriguing that within an arguably more realistic tourna-
ment dynamics, across arguably more realistic problem landscapes, it is neither 
pure groups of experts or pure groups of random heuristics that do best but 
mixed groups including both. In short, the variety and sensitivity of these re-
sults argues against the straightforward application of the Page-Hong result in 
favor of either democracy or epistocracy. That being said, we do not wish to 
undersell the importance of the Hong-Page result – which we still take to be an 
important insight into the nature of group problem solving – or its relevance for 
political theorists.  
Some clarity may be brought to the matter by considering recent classifica-
tion of the many of uses to which models can be put. Grim et al. (2013) distin-
guish between four distinct intellectual contributions models can make, though 
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for our purposes we need just focus on two: emergent explanation and predic-
tion. 
When a model is used to generate an emergent explanation of some phe-
nomenon, the modeler attempts to show that complex outcomes may be the 
result of simpler underlying rules. The output is taken as given and the modeler 
looks for input and mechanisms that could possibly produce such results. Echo-
ing Page (2007, esp. chapter 13), we think there is evidence that suggests that 
diversity has epistemic benefits under some circumstances, though as Page 
(2007) himself cautions readers when he begins to discuss the empirical effects 
of diversity:  
we are not testing the logical truth of the models […] we’re interested in 
whether the hypotheses and insights developed in these stark models shed any 
light on the complex multifaceted real world. Before we begin, two caveats 
are in order. First, the models that we covered do not provide the only candi-
date explanations for the empirical phenomena we discuss […]. Second, even 
if the evidence does align with the models, it need not always do so. (2007, 300) 
Hong and Page have presented one possible way that such advantages might 
come about. Our results indicate similar advantages within a range beyond their 
original findings. 
Political philosophers often have different purposes. In general, they do not 
tend to focus on how some particular event occurred, but wish to know what 
justifies a particular organization of political society or its institutions. One way 
to understand how political philosophers are using models is related to what 
Grim et al. (2013) classify as the ‘predictive’ capacity of models. While they 
are not interested in predicting some particular outcome, political philosophers 
do make arguments that compare the expected results of different ways of 
organizing political life (i.e. “In general, will we be better off leaving decisions 
to experts or groups that are more representative of the population?”). In such 
cases the input and the mechanism are taken as given and the outcome of the 
model is new information. Grim et al. suggest some further direction for those 
wishing to use a model in this way. 
Specifically, one must ensure that both the input and the mechanism match 
the situation in which the model is being put to use. Moreover, because argu-
ments pertain to general outcomes, either such work must be done across the 
range of possible situations or it must be shown that the set of relevant models 
robustly yields the same result across the parameter space. Additional empirical 
work is therefore required to show that both the inputs to the simulation and the 
mechanisms in the simulation sufficiently capture the real-world situation 
being modeled. A complete run down of the Hong-Page model is beyond the 
scope of the paper, but a couple of examples of correspondence should suffice 
to provide a feel for the additional warrant needed if we are to rely on models 
in this capacity. 
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As discussed above, the landscape of the problem turns out to have im-
portant implications for whether diverse groups prove superior. As mentioned 
in Section 3, our choice of ‘smooth’ landscapes represents one of many ways to 
construct landscapes. We chose smoothed landscapes to stay as close as possi-
ble to the original model while illustrating ways in which agents in the original 
landscape failed to qualify as predictive experts. It may well be that some prob-
lems are like this – smooth gradients separated by large troughs, where a solu-
tion can be easily found once a person moves across the conceptual trough. 
Yet, as others have suggested, many problems might be better modeled using 
alternative landscape topologies (Alexander, Himmelreich and Thompson 
2015; Fontanari and Rodrigues 2016). Again, whether a landscape is sufficient 
as a justificatory model is a matter of empirically determining that the relevant 
aspects of the real-world target are indeed captured. 
That said, empirical correspondence is not an intrinsic good. Models need 
not capture every aspect of the target phenomena, only the essential aspects. 
The non-correspondence of irrelevant aspects is a virtue of a good model. 
Which aspects need to be captured is determined by what users want to know 
and the true nature of the target system. As mentioned in Section 2.2, there are 
several potential factors which could be added to the model, but which are left 
out. This abstention does not necessarily undercut the utility of the model. The 
absence of such factors can also be seen as articulating the problem-solving 
dynamics in areas where such elaborations do not make an empirical differ-
ence. Again we trust that one example will suffice. 
One aspect that we noted was that problem solving agents could not antici-
pate the result of multiple steps. One situation where this might plausibly apply 
is insight-learning.9 In such cases, possible solutions come in roughly distinct 
wholes. If a person gets close enough to the solution, the whole solution quick-
ly follows and appears all at once. Nevertheless, there are surely many situa-
tions relevant to political decision-making where solutions are iterative and 
agents consider multiple steps and reach multiple dead-ends before arriving at a 
solution. Here future modeling work might show that the results discussed 
above are robust to such elaborations and thus their non-inclusion in the model 
does no harm. Alternatively, it might show yet another factor which needs to be 
investigated empirically to assess correspondence. 
                                                             
9  The classic example of insight learning is provided in the work of Wolfgang Köhler (1925). In 
his study of problem solving in chimpanzees, he placed bananas out of reach and left ob-
jects in the room, some that could be used for retrieval. For example, in one trial the bana-
nas were placed too high to be reached, but the room contained crates that could be moved 
and stacked to make the food accessible. Chimpanzees did not blindly try random solutions 
until they achieved success (trial-and-error learning) but displayed a “eureka moment” and 
then engaged in goal-directed actions. 
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Until such work is done, modeling only shows increased diversity in our po-
litical representatives can yield more epistemically successful groups. This is 
certainly something for political philosophers to bear in mind, but as we show 
here, closely related models also show the possibility of the opposite effect. For 
just these reasons supporters of epistocracy cannot derive support from our 
results without further work to warrant such conclusions. That is, if the purpose 
of the model is to compare the expected results of different ways of organizing 
political life. 
Prediction is not the only function of modeling. Models, even obviously 
false ones, can serve numerous productive functions (Wimsatt 1987). One great 
virtue of formal models is that assumptions are made explicit. Because of that 
virtue, models make clean targets both for empirical work and for building 
increasingly sophisticated and realistic models. We’ve attempted to offer some 
first steps in developing these models for group problem solving and the epis-
temology of democracy. Many more steps are surely needed.  
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Appendix 
Figure 2: Relay: Areas in Which Groups of Random Heuristics Do Best (      )  
and Areas in Which Groups of the Best-Performing Do Best (      ) 
across a Parameter Sweep of Landscape Smoothness and Max 
Heuristic for Groups of 3, 6, and 9. 
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Figure 3: Relay: Differences in Averages for Groups of Random Heuristics and 
Groups of the Best-Performing for Groups of 3, 6, and 9 
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Figure 4: Relay: Percentages of Runs in Which Groups of the Best-Performing 
Do Better than Groups of Random Heuristics 
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Figure 5: Tournament: Areas in Which Groups of Random Heuristics Do Best  
(     ) and Areas in Which Groups of the Best-Performing Do Best (     ) 
across a Parameter Sweep of Landscape Smoothness and Max 
Heuristic for Groups of 3, 6, and 9 
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Figure 6:Tournament: Differences in Averages for Groups of Random Heuristics 
and Groups of the Best-Performing for Groups of 3, 6, and 9 
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Figure 7: Tournament: Percentages of Runs in Which Groups of the Best-
Performing Do Better than Groups of Random Heuristics 
Groups of 3. 
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